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T

he United States is a superpower in search of a strategy. Following the end
of the Cold War, no new grand strategy has won the bipartisan support that
underpinned America’s strategy of containment from President Truman to
President Reagan. Enthusiastic promoters of globalization occasionally argue
that international trade will be a panacea for conflict, at least among developed
nations.1 The neoconservative vision of unilateral US global hegemony always
lacked adequate military forces and funding to realize its ambitious goals. 2
Now, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the hegemony strategy also lacks public
support.3 Most critics of the hegemony strategy, however, have failed to propose a credible alternative capable of guiding US national security. 4
The philosophical void at the highest levels of American statecraft
should be of particular concern for America’s armed forces. If, as Clausewitz
wrote, war is policy by other means, then the purposes and structure of the US
military cannot be debated or planned except in the context of a larger vision
of America’s goals in the world. The claim that following 11 September 2001
the United States is engaged in a “Long War” or a “Global War on Terrorism”
provides little guidance, because minimizing the threat from al Qaeda and
other jihadists is primarily a matter for intelligence agencies, police, and first
responders, with the military playing a critical but supporting role.
A new grand strategy for the United States should be compatible with
the nation’s fundamental values and capable of achieving American goals in
the world order that will emerge in the decades ahead. Neither the strategy of
US hegemony nor two proposed alternatives, neoisolationism and offshore
balancing, meet these tests. The United States needs to prepare itself for a mul48
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tipolar world in which it is not a solitary hegemon but rather one of several
great powers, even if it is the most powerful for decades to come. And the
United States has to prepare itself to cooperate in the interest of security with
other major powers either as a member of a great-power concert or as a participant in an alliance against one or more powerful aggressors. Because similar
military capabilities would be required in either a concert of power or a balance
of power strategy, this approach can be defined as a concert-balance strategy
for a multipolar world.

US Strategy: Make the World Safe for Democracy
Following World War II, the influence of continental European conceptions of power politics, advocated by émigré realists such as Nicholas
Spykman, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, led to the neglect of the
unique American tradition of grand strategy which views the purpose of American foreign policy as shaping an environment favorable to the preservation of the
United States as a civilian, liberal, commercial, and democratic republic.
Making the world “safe for democracy,” in the words of Woodrow Wilson, was
not a utopian delusion, as European-style realists often claim, but a practical effort to preserve the kind of geopolitical environment in which the fragile institutions of a democratic republic with a free-enterprise economy would survive.5
Although the term “garrison state” was coined by American sociologist Harold Lasswell in 1941, the fear that the United States would be forced
by foreign threats to become a militarized regime has haunted American
statesmen since the founding of the republic. A hostile hegemon that dominated Europe, Asia, or both might force Americans to remodel their republic
into a “Fortress America,” in which citizens reluctantly obtained security at
the expense of civil liberties, economic freedom, and legislative and judicial
oversight. A Fortress America could also be the result of America’s repeated
participation in costly and violent balance of power conflicts such as the two
World Wars and the Cold War.
To avoid the necessity of defensive militarization resulting from frequent participation in balance of power wars, the United States pursued a policy
of “non-entanglement” in the nineteenth century, creating its own sphere of influence in North America while staying out of European conflicts. In the twentieth century, the prospect of German or Soviet hegemony beyond North America
overcame American reluctance to intervene in the Old World. Walter Lippmann,
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who served in the Woodrow Wilson Administration, wrote that if Germany won
World War I “the defense of the Western Hemisphere would require immense
armaments over and above those needed in the Pacific, and that America would
have to live in a perpetual state of high and alert military preparedness. It was in
this very concrete and practical sense . . . that a German victory in 1917 would
have made the world unsafe for the American democracies from Canada to the
Argentine.”6 In President Wilson’s own words to his adviser Colonel Edward M.
House, “If Germany won it would change the course of our civilization and make
the United States a military nation . . . .”7 In the years between the outbreak of
World War II in 1939 and the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, US internationalists similarly argued that in an Axis-dominated world the United States would
be forced to become a garrison state. In You Can’t Do Business with Hitler
(1941), Douglas Miller, a US diplomat who had served in Germany, wrote: “We
should have to be a whole nation of ‘Minutemen,’ ready to rush to arms at the
first sign of invasion.”8 The same argument was made in NSC-68, the Truman
Administration’s blueprint for the policy of containing the Soviet Union: “As
the Soviet Union mobilized the military resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened its threat to our security, some [Americans] would be tempted to accept ‘peace’ on its terms, while many would seek to
defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit
the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a
state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.”9 In his farewell address to the American people
on 17 January 1961, President Eisenhower, while insisting that the Soviet Union
was to blame for the defensive militarization of the United States, worried about
the long-term effects of militarization on American society: “This conjunction
of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the
American experience . . . . We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.”10
The goal of American statesmen including Woodrow Wilson and
Franklin D. Roosevelt was not simply to thwart a bid for hegemony by a hostile
power or a hostile alliance; it was to replace a system of warring great powers
with a concert of power, or in Wilson’s words “a community of power.” 11 The
idea behind the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations after World War II was that a small number of great powers would cooperate to
police the world rather than battle to carve it up. If one or more great powers
launched a campaign of aggression, like Germany in both World Wars and the
Soviet Union after 1945, then instead of a concert of power there would need to
be a balance of power alliance against the aggressive states. In a multipolar
world, the system can go from concert of power to balance of power and back.
50
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Once a former aggressor is defeated, it can be rehabilitated and encouraged to
resume a constructive role as a member of the great-power concert. Even in the
absence of a global concert, the United States can take part in regional concerts,
in areas with multiple great powers such as East Asia and Europe.
The concert of power and the balance of power strategies, then, are
complementary, not contradictory. The United States prefers a peaceful world
in which all great powers cooperate in a concert; but the United States also has
to be prepared for the possibility that one or more other great powers will become hostile. For this reason, it makes sense to speak of a single “concertbalance” strategy.
This assumes, to be sure, that grand strategy is first and foremost
about US relations with other great powers. That assumption is necessary, because the potential costs of great-power conflict dwarf those of all other kinds,
including terrorism by stateless groups, individuals, and minor powers. Unless
it is advocated that great-power conflict has vanished forever, the primary focus of American grand strategy should be on cooperation—and, where necessary, conflict—with other great powers in a multipolar system of states.

The Hegemony Strategy
The concert-balance strategy can be contrasted with the hegemony
strategy associated with neoconservative strategic thinkers and adopted as
official policy by the administration of President George W. Bush. Both the
concert-balance strategy and the hegemony strategy seek to provide a secure
world order in which American values and institutions can flourish. But they
seek this common goal by radically different means. According to proponents
of the hegemony strategy, the best way to achieve a world safe for American
democracy is for the United States to maintain an unchallenged monopoly of
power in every key region. It is not enough for the United States to be first
among equals; the United States is required to be more powerful than all other
great powers combined.
In addition to the missions shared by all US strategies, including
homeland defense, deterrence, and US global power projection, the hegemony strategy requires the United States to pursue three unique missions: dissuasion, reassurance, and coercive nonproliferation. In the words of the
Pentagon’s 1992 Defense Planning Guidance draft, the United States must
adopt a strategy of dissuading or “deterring potential competitors from even
aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”12 Neoconservative journalists
William Kristol and Robert Kagan made the same argument for perpetual US
global hegemony: “The more Washington is able to make clear that it is futile
to compete with American power, either in size of forces or in technological
capabilities, the less chance there is that countries like China or Iran will enAutumn 2008
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tertain ambitions of upsetting the present world order.” 13 President Bush endorsed the idea of dissuasion in his 2002 West Point commencement address:
“Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our
world is not . . . . America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond
challenge . . . making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and
limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”14
Second, the United States needs to be willing to go to war, if necessary,
to “reassure” its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. In this way the
United States, according to the Pentagon draft, will “account sufficiently for the
interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging
our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.” In The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in
the Twenty-first Century, political scientist Michael Mandelbaum writes: “Reassurance ensures against what might happen, and the need for it arises from the
structure of the system of sovereign states. Because no superior power controls
relations among them, an attack by one against another is always possible. Governments therefore tend to take steps to prepare to defend themselves . . . . But
military preparations that one country undertakes for purely defensive reasons
can appear threatening to others, which may then take military measures of their
own and so set in motion a spiral of mistrust and military buildups.” Fortunately,
according to Mandelbaum, “The American military presence in Europe acts as a
barrier against such an undesirable chain of events. It reassures the Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their armed forces to protect themselves
against the possibility of a resurgent Russia . . . . At the same time, the American
presence reassures Russia that its great adversary of the first half of the twentieth
century, Germany, will not adopt policies of the kind that led to two destructive
German invasions in 1914 and 1941.”15
The dissuasion strategy would require the United States to unilaterally
spend more on the military than most or all other great powers combined—
indefinitely. “Americans should be glad that their defense capabilities are as
great as the next six powers combined,” Kristol and Kagan wrote in 1996. “Indeed, they may even want to enshrine this disparity in US defense strategy . . . .
Perhaps the United States should inaugurate such a two- (or three-, or four-)
power standard of its own, which would preserve its military supremacy regardless of the near-term global threats.”16
America’s contemporary military primacy, however, is easily exaggerated. In 2004-2005, the United States accounted for 45 percent of global spending on the military.17 This was chiefly the result of decisions by other great
powers to spend less on defense after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. If
the other NATO allies had continued to spend as much on defense as they had in
1985, US spending would have exceeded theirs by only ten percent.18
52
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The reassurance strategy provides a rationale for a strategy of coercive nonproliferation by the United States or allies such as Israel that goes beyond the need to prevent hostile states from using weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) to attack America and its allies directly or through provision of WMD
to stateless terrorists. If a hostile neighbor acquires WMD, then important allies and clients of the United States may cease to be “reassured” by the offer of
unilateral US protection and might seek to acquire WMD of their own. For example, if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, the result might be the acquisition of
defensive nuclear weapons in response by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, and other
Mideastern countries. Such a regional nuclear arms race might not lead to war
or threaten the United States directly, but it potentially would cause the collapse of America’s role as security guarantor and thus of the reassurance strategy as a foundation of US hegemony. Under any strategy, the United States
might be concerned by proliferation, but the threat of proliferation to US offers
of reassurance to allies and clients makes nonproliferation efforts, by means including preventive war, central to the hegemony strategy. The strategy seeks to
indefinitely forestall military self-reliance, including nuclear self-reliance, by
current US allies in the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia.

The Concert-Balance Strategy
Unlike the hegemony strategy, the concert-balance strategy does not
require the United States by itself to dissuade potential aggressors or reassure
allies by means of a perpetual, unilateral arms build-up. In this strategy, the
task of dissuading potential aggressors would rest with a concert or alliance
including but not limited to the United States. The potential aggressor would
be deterred by the combined might of the United States and its allies, not US
might alone. For this reason, the concert-balance strategy would be less
costly to the United States.
If it followed a concert-balance strategy the United States would
also reject the mission of reassuring other great powers. The status of Japan
and West Germany as protected cooperators with the United States was an
anomaly of the Cold War. Proponents of US hegemony seek to maintain the
perpetual subordination of Japan and Germany to the United States. By contrast, in a concert-balance strategy, a fully rehabilitated and independent Japan and Germany would be expected to completely contribute both in a
traditional concert of power, and, in the event of great-power conflict, a traditional alliance of formal if not actual equals. A policy of elevating Japan and
Germany from dependent US protectorates to normal US allies, like the rejection of the policy of dissuasion, would make the concert-balance strategy less
expensive than a US hegemony strategy.
Autumn 2008
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The rejection of reassurance as a goal of US strategy would similarly
curtail preventive wars of nonproliferation as a means of preserving reassurance. The United States would not be willing to go to war with a nuclear Iran
in order to prevent development of a nuclear Saudi Arabia or Egypt, nor
would it be willing to fight nuclear North Korea to prevent the Japanese from
obtaining their own nuclear deterrent, if they thought one necessary.
If the United States adopted a concert-balance strategy, then it might
sometimes need to join allies in interventions against regional aggressors. For
this reason proponents of a concert-balance strategy should be as concerned as
proponents of the hegemony strategy about the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other WMD that would raise the costs of intervening in weaker countries by
a great-power concert or alliance. But in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the idea of
preventive wars of nonproliferation, whether unilateral or multilateral, has been
discredited. Nonproliferation policy in the future should be pursued by means
short of bombing, invasion, and occupation. Where nonproliferation efforts fail,
history so far suggests that deterrence will prove to be effective.

Rising Costs of US Unilateralism
The concert-balance strategy, while still expensive compared to
neoisolationism, would be far less costly than a US grand strategy of hegemony. Adherents of the hegemony strategy sometimes claim that the United
States can easily afford to spend the huge amount of resources on the military
that dissuasion and reassurance would require. But even if that were true, the
American public is not likely to support permanently higher defense expenditures, once the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded. Even if the
problem of health care costs increasing at a rate faster than gross domestic
product (GDP) is solved in the near future, the growth of the population of retirees in the United States may raise Social Security and Medicare spending by at
least four percent of GDP. It seems unlikely that the American electorate will
tolerate either the substantial tax increases or the substantial cuts in middleclass entitlements needed to spend four to six percent of US GDP permanently
on the military, as some have proposed.
In any event, the costs of the hegemony strategy, if it were seriously
pursued, inevitably would rise to levels the United States could not afford if the
policy of dissuasion failed and growing powers such as China chose to make
their military power commensurate with their economic strength. The French International Relations Institute has predicted that by 2050 Greater China (China,
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) will be the world’s leading economic power,
accounting for 24 percent of the international economy. North America (the
United States, Canada, and Mexico) would be next, with 23 percent of world
GDP.19 The US investment bank Goldman Sachs reached similar conclusions,
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predicting that by 2050 China will have the largest economy, followed by the
United States and India. The next tier might be occupied by Russia, Brazil, and
Japan, and a third tier would include Germany, Britain, and other once-mighty
European economic powers. The European share of the global economy may decline from its current 22 percent, roughly comparable to that of the United States,
to only 12 percent in 2050.20
China and India do not need to match the American standard of living in order to match or surpass the United States in military spending. If
China’s per capita GDP matched that of contemporary South Korea, its overall GDP would be 1.35 times that of the United States. Should China’s per capita GDP reach one-half of modern Japan’s, its total GDP would be 2.5 times
that of the United States. If one-quarter of the Indian population enjoyed
American living standards, that one-quarter might match the entire US population’s level of affluence in 2050. The affluent minority in China or India
might provide a larger internal market and more scientists and engineers than
the United States as a whole.
Unlike the hegemony strategy, the concert-balance strategy avoids
insolvency by abandoning a doomed effort to forestall the emergence of a
multipolar world by perpetually outspending all other great powers combined. Instead, the concert-balance strategy would compensate for the inevitable global diffusion of military power by adding the strength of other great
powers to America’s own strength. This method has been in place for almost
70 years; the United States defeated Germany twice and the Soviet Union as a
member of a coalition of powerful countries. Why, then, should the United
States position itself to defeat a hostile great power in the future alone and unaided by other nations? In the event of genuine aggression by a would-be regional or global hegemon, the United States will be certain to find allies,
including other great powers under greater immediate threat from the aggressor than the United States. The failures of US isolationism taught Americans
that they cannot shift the burden of defending a secure world to others.
Sharing the burden with strong allies worked in the past and can work in the
future. As G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan have written, the
United States should move “with—rather than against—the secular diffusion
of global power. The scope of American primacy will wane as this century
progresses; the ultimate objective should be to channel rising centers of
power into cooperative partnerships with the United States.” 21

Implications for the US Military
An adequate grand strategy has to be capable of informing decisions
about the missions and structure of the US military. The concert-balance
Autumn 2008

55

strategy calls for a force structure significantly different from the one that
would be required to carry out the hegemony strategy.
This article has already discussed one difference. The rejection of
dissuasion as a unilateral mission for the United States, and the assignment of
responsibility for dissuasion and deterrence to concerts or alliances to which
America belongs, means a smaller overall US military than the one required
by the hegemony strategy. Potential aggressors should be overmatched by the
combined strength of the United States and its major allies—not by the
United States alone.
The concert-balance strategy, as befits its dual name, would need
forces appropriate for two situations. In the first, the concert of power scenario,
the world’s great powers would cooperate in a fluctuating alliance, which
would sometimes carry out joint interventions in areas of common concern. In
the second situation, the balance of power scenario, relations among the great
powers would deteriorate and the United States would need to join a balance of
power alliance that checks the aggression of a hostile state or group.
At first glance, these two scenarios might seem to require two different
kinds of militaries—a modest military designed for limited interventions conducted by a great-power concert and another, massive military designed to defeat hostile great powers. But this is not the case. Because of the nuclear
revolution, conventional wars among great powers such as the United States,
China, Russia, Japan, India, and the major European nations remain unlikely.22
Any balance-of-power struggles among great powers most likely would take the
form of cold wars rather than conventional wars. Like the recently ended Cold
War, these future cold wars would be a blend of arms races, embargoes, and indirect proxy wars of the kind that were fought in Korea, Vietnam, and Soviet-era
Afghanistan. There would be no need to maintain vast conventional forces designed to invade and occupy another great power or great powers. Instead, future
cold wars are likely to end as the first Cold War did, as a result of negotiation and
without enemy troops on the soil of the great power that capitulates.
A balance of power strategy, then, would require a Cold War military,
not a World War military. (Arguably during the late Cold War the US military
was itself too much of a World War military, given the predominance of forces
designed for an unlikely conventional clash with the Soviet Union that never
came.) As it happens, a US military designed to fight a future cold war would be
similar in force structure to the military intended to take part in joint actions by a
great-power concert. The same deterrent forces that could successfully oppose a
potential great-power foe also could intimidate lesser states that challenge the
authority of a great-power concert which includes the United States. A US military equipped to take part in proxy wars during future “cold” conflicts with rival
great powers would also be well-suited to take part in joint great-power military
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and humanitarian interventions in anarchic areas of concern. What is required by
the concert-balance strategy is a mix of forces that would prove to be of equal
utility when the great powers get along (concert) and when they do not (balance).

Missions for the Military
With this criterion of flexibility in mind, it is useful to spell out the missions of the armed forces as part of a concert-balance strategy in more detail. The
overly ambitious and too costly missions of dissuasion and reassurance, critical
to the hegemonic strategy, would be rejected by the concert-balance strategy,
leaving five core missions for the US military: deterrence, homeland defense,
securing the global commons, power projection, and expeditionary intervention.
Deterrence
The purpose of America’s deterrent forces, which could include
conventional precision-guided munitions in addition to or instead of nuclear
weapons, would be to deter attacks on the American homeland and against allies. During periods of great-power cooperation, the combined arsenals of the
great powers could deter minor powers; during periods of great-power rivalry, the military capability of the United States and its allies should overmatch those of their common great-power enemies.
Homeland Defense
Here again, similar capabilities would serve a concert strategy and a
balance strategy. In a period of great-power harmony, homeland defense would
be focused on preventing terrorism by stateless groups and state-sponsored terrorism in the United States. During periods of great-power rivalry, the same
homeland defense capabilities could thwart attempts by a hostile great power
to wage asymmetric warfare by sabotaging US infrastructure or terrorizing the
US population.
Securing the Global Commons
Securing what the political scientist Barry R. Posen calls “the global
commons” of sea, air, and space is a precondition for effective US command
and control and power projection, whether as part of great-power concert activities or as a member of an alliance in a great-power struggle.23
Power Projection
Even in a multipolar world, the United States, as the great power that
is most remote from other great powers and contested areas, has an interest in
specializing in global power projection through a secured global commons,
whether as a member of a concert that includes all major powers or as a member of an alliance with a particular foe or foes.
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Expeditionary Intervention
Conventional war with other great powers is highly unlikely, thanks
not only to mutual deterrence by nuclear weapons but also the sheer cost of
conventional conflict itself. In the event of a new cold war involving a hostile
power or great-power coalition, the United States, alone or with allies, might
need to take part in proxy conflicts, whether by training indigenous military
and police forces or by introducing US forces, as a last resort, against indigenous forces supported by a great-power rival. In the absence of great-power
cold wars, the United States, as a leading member of a great power concert,
would need similar expeditionary capabilities in order to participate in joint
interventions to accomplish regional security or humanitarian relief. The expeditionary forces need not be extremely large, if, in most interventions, the
United States relies chiefly on allies or on indigenous forces that it trains and
arms, using its own troops as a force multiplier.
How the US military should be assigned to carry out these five missions is a subject for debate. The Navy and Air Force would be chiefly responsible for deterrence, securing the global commons, and power projection by means
of sealift and airlift. Given the unlikelihood of World War II-style battles among
surface navies, a “riverine” navy capable of operating in anarchic regions,
backed up perhaps by aircraft carriers and other forms of seabasing, with submarines to protect the sealanes, might make more sense than an anachronistic fleet
of surface combatants designed for conventional wars with rival naval powers.
Homeland defense—both against stateless terrorists and foreign states
that engage in sabotage, sponsor terrorism, or carry out direct attacks on the
United States—could be a duty divided among civilian first responders and the
reserves. Alternately homeland defense might become the primary responsibility of the US Army, as it was throughout most of American history. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the limitations of a model of homeland
disaster response in which the military is employed only after local and state authorities have failed. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that the US homeland is a
potential battlefield, and nostalgia for the twentieth century, when the US Army
fought only abroad, should not blind either the military or civilians to the central
role of the armed forces in protecting American soil. The Army may not want to
act as a domestic police force and first responder, but in the aftermath of another
catastrophic terrorist attack or an attack by another state those are the tasks it
may need to carry out. In future great-power conflicts the United States may not
have the luxury of sending ground forces overseas while leaving the homeland
relatively undefended. A policy of using the same general-purpose force to defend the homeland and engage in expeditionary interventions overseas might invite a hostile power to promote chaos behind the lines in the United States itself.
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The term “expeditionary forces” is used here rather than “constabulary forces.” Some strategists have proposed the establishment of two separate
forces—a conventional warfighting force to defeat enemy armed forces and a
constabulary force to conduct stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations (SSTR) and irregular war (IW). Such a duplication of effort makes
no sense. With the example of Saddam Hussein’s fate in mind, it is highly unlikely that any weak conventional power will expose itself to destruction by US
conventional forces. In the event that one did so, it would make no sense for
specialized US warfighting forces to smash the armed forces and the state apparatus, only to step aside and make room for separate, specialized constabulary forces whose mission was to bring order in the chaos that followed. What
the United States needs are forces that are capable both of warfighting and constabulary duties—in short, versatile expeditionary forces that could be used in
unilateral or joint great-power SSTR/IW operations and also in proxy wars in
which the main antagonists dare not attack each other directly. Dual-purpose
Army forces, along with the Marines, could provide the core of a flexible expeditionary force for a concert-balance strategy.24
The concert-balance strategy represents the best national security
strategy for the United States in an era of emerging multipolarity and domestic
budget constraints. It abandons the exorbitantly expensive and ultimately
doomed attempt to forever forestall the emergence of other great powers by
means of dissuasion of potential foes and reassurance of friends, in order to realistically prepare for the US role as a leader of concerts and alliances in a multipolar world. It draws both on American idealism—the dream of collective
security shared by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with millions of
people around the world—and on American pragmatism—the successful experience of the United States during the World Wars and Cold War as a leading
member of great-power alliances rather than a solitary superpower. Since the
end of the Cold War, the United States has lacked a credible vision capable of
guiding American national security policy in the multipolar world of tomorrow
without bankrupting the economy or exhausting public support. The concertbalance strategy provides that missing vision.
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